Against meta-ethical hedonism

Abstract

The paper argues that the view that pleasure is the only thing that matters intrinsically, which the author terms “meta-ethical hedonism,” is a bad argument. It is argued that non-naturalist forms of meta-ethical hedonism fail to adequately address the epistemic objection to non-naturalism, which holds that there is no way to justify beliefs about non-natural properties. The paper then argues that naturalist forms of meta-ethical hedonism, such as the view that goodness is identical with pleasure by definition, are also not adequately supported by the claim that we have direct acquaintance with the phenomenology of pleasure. The author concludes that meta-ethical hedonism is not supported by the arguments offered for it, and that it is too restrictive, as it suggests that only our judgments about our phenomenological experiences are immune from epistemic doubt. The author instead suggests a more expansive view, termed “the mystery view,” which acknowledges that our epistemic access to non-natural properties, phenomenal properties, and other domains such as mathematics, is fundamentally mysterious, and that this mystery is an essential part of acknowledging the limits of our knowledge. – AI-generated abstract