The possibility of parity

Abstract

Some comparisons are difficult. For example, how do we compare two careers, such as one in accounting and another in skydiving? Philosophers have traditionally addressed this difficulty by holding that if two items are comparable, then they must be better, worse, or equally good. This paper argues against this trichotomy thesis. It suggests that there is a fourth relation of comparability, which holds when none of the relations of the trichotomy hold. This fourth relation is called ‘on a par.’ The paper defends the possibility of parity with two arguments: the Small-Improvement Argument and the Chaining Argument. The Small-Improvement Argument shows that there are some items for which it is false that one is better or worse than the other and false that they are equally good. The Chaining Argument shows that even when none of the three relations of the trichotomy holds, the items may still be comparable. The paper then considers objections to these arguments that they trade on the vagueness of the comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ’equally good,’ and argues that these objections are misguided. It concludes by arguing that superhard cases (those that appear to pass the Small-Improvement and Chaining Arguments) are not borderline applications of a vague predicate and are therefore cases of parity. – AI-generated abstract