Ruling out helium-maximizing

Abstract

Externalist accounts of normative truth can be accused of positing the logical possibility of a radical mismatch between one’s normative attitudes and the demands of normative reality; this has been termed ’normative alienation.’ We may reasonably expect that our own attitudes are not radically wrong, but we might still worry that others could be. Internalist accounts can outright deny the logical possibility of radical normative alienation, but this comes at the cost of being committed to claims that seem implausible, such as the claim that no fool could really want to maximize helium. By rejecting internalism, externalism need not make any concessions on this point. However, the question of normative alienation still lurks. If we are to be externalists and yet maintain that normative reality will not utterly baffle us, the best option is to allow that normative reality might surprise us in a weaker sense: even if we initially hold a view like prioritarianism that we are rightly confident in, it turns out to be slightly mistaken, and yet another theory that we might have reasonably considered turns out to be the correct one. – AI-generated abstract.