Non-median and Condorcet-loser presidents in Latin America: A factor of instability

Abstract

Both the longer duration of present democratic regimes in Latin America in comparison with past historical periods and their high levels of political instability can be partly explained by the role of electoral rules. In this paper several electoral rules are evaluated for their results on the basis of more than 111 presidential and 137 congressional elections in 18 Latin American countries during the current democratic periods. First, a focus is cast on the probability that elected presidents have the support of the median-voter’s first preference, which is a proxy for the winner’s popular acceptance or rejection. The frequency of median voter’s or Condorcet-winner presidents appears to be higher under rules with a second-round runoff than under simple plurality rule. The victory of Condorcet-loser or the most rejected candidate is discarded under majority runoff rule. The replacement of plurality rule with second-round rules during the last few decades may help explaining the relatively higher acceptance and duration of democratic regimes in the region. Second, the degree of consistency of the presidential winners with the party distribution of seats in congress is considered because it configures more or less cooperative or conflictive inter-institutional relations. More than half of democratic presidents have not belonged to the median voter’s party in the presidential or the congressional elections. Many of them have faced wide popular and political opposition and entered into inter-institutional conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]; Copyright of Conference Papers – American Political Science Association is the property of American Political Science Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder’s express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)