What do we learn from the repugnant conclusion?

Abstract

Population theory lacks a stable standard for evaluating different social states, where different states have varying utility sums but contradictory distributions of non-utility values. This issue arises due to issues of commensurability between utility values and non-utility values. Non-utility values are often difficult to compare, as their worth may be subjective and vary widely among individuals. The impossibility theorem developed in this paper shows that, under specific assumptions, no social welfare function can simultaneously satisfy four intuitive axioms: universal domain, value of total utility, value pluralism, and the nonvanishing value axiom. This implies that we cannot find a social welfare function that can always rank social outcomes without producing counterintuitive or repugnant conclusions. As a result, the search for a general theory of beneficence that encompasses population comparisons, which has occupied Derek Parfit and other moral philosophers, is futile. – AI-generated abstract.