Longtermism, aggregation, and catastrophic risk

Abstract

Longtermism is the view that we should prioritize the well-being of future people, even if their existence is uncertain and distant. Proponents of longtermism often appeal to the vast potential value of future generations to justify this prioritization. However, this paper argues that longtermism is incompatible with plausible deontic skepticism about aggregation, challenging the view that interventions that benefit future people are always morally preferable to those that benefit people in the present. Deontic skepticism holds that moral wrongness cannot be determined by simply aggregating individual harms or benefits. When considering future-oriented interventions, this skepticism implies that the extremely weak claims of future people generated by most long-term interventions cannot outweigh the stronger claims of people in the present. Therefore, deontic skepticism suggests that we should not always prioritize the interests of future people over those of people living now. – AI-generated abstract.