Summary of discussion

Abstract

This discussion examines the conceptual foundations of “Classical Prudence” and the appropriate framework for criticizing imprudent behavior. The participants debate whether failing to care for one’s future self should be classified as a form of irrationality, a moral transgression, or a distinct category of evaluative failure. Daniel Dennett suggests that imprudence is immoral insofar as it imposes future burdens on society, while Derek Parfit argues for an impartial consequentialist view wherein increasing the total sum of suffering is morally criticizable even in isolation. Richard Rorty questions the necessity of the irrationality-immorality binary, while Harry Frankfurt and Alasdair MacIntyre offer alternative models based on self-relational values and special duties analogous to parental obligations. The dialogue further explores the implications of personal identity for these positions, specifically addressing whether a lack of psychological connectedness justifies treating the future self as a distinct entity to whom one owes moral duties. Ultimately, the discussion highlights a shift from viewing prudence strictly as a requirement of practical reason toward a framework where temporal partiality is analyzed through the lenses of moral philosophy and psychological continuity.