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Johan P. Du Plessis Moore Vs Progressivism: Must Uncertainty Make Us Conservative? article G. E. Moore’s account of right conduct in Principia Ethica generates a decidedly conservative ethic under conditions of uncertainty, suggesting that novel moral rules cannot be justified and advising individuals to follow conventional morality or act egoistically. This conservatism stems from an excessively demanding epistemic standard that requires agents to know the infinite consequences of their actions or assume distant effects will not reverse near-term goods. When replaced by an expected-value framework operating over foreseeable horizons, progressive moral reform becomes epistemically and normatively viable. Using veganism as a paradigmatic example, novel rules can satisfy relevant feasibility constraints regarding agent dispositions, social applicability, and contingency, even when accounting for the costs of institutionalization and economic transition. Individual adherence to an unobserved rule likewise yields positive expected value independently of universal compliance. Consequentialist analysis can also justify protest aimed at institutionalizing new rules, though an epistemic tension emerges between the probabilistic confidence warranted by ethical deliberation and the psychological conviction typically needed for sustained activism. – AI-generated abstract.

Moore Vs Progressivism: Must Uncertainty Make Us Conservative?

Johan P. Du Plessis

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2026

Abstract

G. E. Moore’s account of right conduct in Principia Ethica generates a decidedly conservative ethic under conditions of uncertainty, suggesting that novel moral rules cannot be justified and advising individuals to follow conventional morality or act egoistically. This conservatism stems from an excessively demanding epistemic standard that requires agents to know the infinite consequences of their actions or assume distant effects will not reverse near-term goods. When replaced by an expected-value framework operating over foreseeable horizons, progressive moral reform becomes epistemically and normatively viable. Using veganism as a paradigmatic example, novel rules can satisfy relevant feasibility constraints regarding agent dispositions, social applicability, and contingency, even when accounting for the costs of institutionalization and economic transition. Individual adherence to an unobserved rule likewise yields positive expected value independently of universal compliance. Consequentialist analysis can also justify protest aimed at institutionalizing new rules, though an epistemic tension emerges between the probabilistic confidence warranted by ethical deliberation and the psychological conviction typically needed for sustained activism. – AI-generated abstract.