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Brian D. Earp Does Religion Deserve a Place in Secular Medicine? article Allowing institutional, dogma-based religion to govern secular healthcare policy introduces substantial risks to patient welfare, particularly regarding reproductive freedom, end-of-life decisions, and non-discriminatory care. While prominent arguments advocate for a recognized place for religion in secular medical ethics, they paradoxically disavow appeals to religious authority, scriptural mandates, and non-rational premises, insisting instead that religious believers persuade others through dialectical argument. Under these constraints, religious discourse functions under the exact same meta-ethical rules, standards of coherence, and justificatory demands as secular moral philosophy. Secular ethical frameworks can routinely reach the same moral conclusions—such as the prima facie prohibition against taking human life—without relying on theological premises, meaning religious traditions provide no unique epistemic warrant in public bioethics. Religious individuals are fully entitled to participate in secular policy debates, provided they conform to universal philosophical standards of reason. However, framing this standard philosophical exchange as the inclusion of “religion” constitutes a misleading semantic substitution: once stripped of authority and dogma, religious argumentation ceases to be functionally distinct from conventional moral philosophy, rendering its claimed distinctiveness unoriginal. – AI-generated abstract.

Does Religion Deserve a Place in Secular Medicine?

Brian D. Earp

Does Religion Deserve a Place in Secular Medicine?, 2015

Abstract

Allowing institutional, dogma-based religion to govern secular healthcare policy introduces substantial risks to patient welfare, particularly regarding reproductive freedom, end-of-life decisions, and non-discriminatory care. While prominent arguments advocate for a recognized place for religion in secular medical ethics, they paradoxically disavow appeals to religious authority, scriptural mandates, and non-rational premises, insisting instead that religious believers persuade others through dialectical argument. Under these constraints, religious discourse functions under the exact same meta-ethical rules, standards of coherence, and justificatory demands as secular moral philosophy. Secular ethical frameworks can routinely reach the same moral conclusions—such as the prima facie prohibition against taking human life—without relying on theological premises, meaning religious traditions provide no unique epistemic warrant in public bioethics. Religious individuals are fully entitled to participate in secular policy debates, provided they conform to universal philosophical standards of reason. However, framing this standard philosophical exchange as the inclusion of “religion” constitutes a misleading semantic substitution: once stripped of authority and dogma, religious argumentation ceases to be functionally distinct from conventional moral philosophy, rendering its claimed distinctiveness unoriginal. – AI-generated abstract.