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Rem B. Edwards Do Pleasures and Pains Differ Qualitatively? article Quantitative hedonism assumes that pleasure and pain are univocal qualities differing only in intensity, duration, and causal relations. This assumption fails to account for the diverse nature of human experience, which suggests that feelings differ fundamentally in quality. Such qualitative differences are best understood through the distinction between localized and non-localized experiences. Localized pleasures and pains, such as sensory gratification or physical injury, are phenomenologically tied to specific bodily regions. In contrast, non-localized feelings, including intellectual satisfaction, aesthetic appreciation, grief, or guilt, represent general states of consciousness lacking a precise physical locus. These “higher” and “lower” categories are not merely variations of a single property but represent a family of distinct feelings that are often inseparable from their intentional objects. Consequently, the value of a state of consciousness cannot be determined solely through quantitative measurement. By acknowledging that specific feeling tones are intrinsically linked to their sources, qualitative hedonism offers a robust framework for evaluating human well-being that reflects the actual complexity of inner life. – AI-generated abstract.

Do Pleasures and Pains Differ Qualitatively?

Rem B. Edwards

The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 9, no. 4, 1975, pp. 270--281

Abstract

Quantitative hedonism assumes that pleasure and pain are univocal qualities differing only in intensity, duration, and causal relations. This assumption fails to account for the diverse nature of human experience, which suggests that feelings differ fundamentally in quality. Such qualitative differences are best understood through the distinction between localized and non-localized experiences. Localized pleasures and pains, such as sensory gratification or physical injury, are phenomenologically tied to specific bodily regions. In contrast, non-localized feelings, including intellectual satisfaction, aesthetic appreciation, grief, or guilt, represent general states of consciousness lacking a precise physical locus. These “higher” and “lower” categories are not merely variations of a single property but represent a family of distinct feelings that are often inseparable from their intentional objects. Consequently, the value of a state of consciousness cannot be determined solely through quantitative measurement. By acknowledging that specific feeling tones are intrinsically linked to their sources, qualitative hedonism offers a robust framework for evaluating human well-being that reflects the actual complexity of inner life. – AI-generated abstract.

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