I can't believe I'm stupid

Abstract

This paper explores the complex psychological state that occurs when one becomes aware of their cognitive faculties being unreliable or anti-reliable. It distinguishes between unreliability, where the faculty is not tracking the truth particularly well, and anti-reliability, where it tends to go positively wrong. In cases of unreliability, the authors argue that the strength and resiliency of beliefs derived from the unreliable faculty should be reduced, with the reduction depending on the extent of unreliability and the quality of competing sources of information. News of anti-reliability, on the other hand, creates a situation where the only stable state of belief is to suspend judgment, as any other state would undermine itself. The core thesis is that, while it can be reasonable to count someone else as an anti-expert, it is never reasonable to count oneself as one, no matter what evidence is presented. – AI-generated abstract.