Pascal and decision theory

Abstract

Pascal’s Wager parallels Jesuit rhetorical strategies by addressing self-interested audiences and framing salvation as a rational response to infinite expected utility. Although the Wager anticipates modern decision theory, it incorporates a nuanced psychology of human behavior that acknowledges the instability of desires, the influence of self-deception, and the role of divertissement. The mathematical validity of the Wager remains contingent upon specific interpretations of probability, risk neutrality, and the structure of temporal discounting. However, the argument falters when confronted with the “many-gods” objection and the lack of an empirical criterion for distinguishing “real possibility” from abstract conceivability. The proposed psychological transition to faith through habituation—acting as if one believes to induce sincerity—necessitates a self-erasing cognitive process. Crucially, a profound tension persists between the Wager’s emphasis on individual effort and the Jansenist doctrine of predestination. The internal logic of the Wager requires a semi-Pelagian conception of human agency, creating an ironic dependency on the very theological framework Pascal sought to refute in his polemics against the Jesuits. – AI-generated abstract.