Adjusting utility for justice: a consequentialist reply to the objection from justice

Abstract

This article challenges a common criticism of consequentialism: that it fails to take seriously the distinction between persons. The argument goes that consequentialism allows for unjust outcomes when it dictates that the morally right action is the one that maximizes overall utility, even if that means distributing benefits disproportionately to the deserving. The author shows that this criticism is based on a faulty axioloy that underlies traditional forms of consequentialism. They propose a new axioloy, ‘justice-adjusted hedonism’ (JH), which incorporates the concept of desert. According to JH, the intrinsic value of pleasure or pain depends not only on the amount of pleasure or pain received but also on the extent to which the recipient deserves it. The author argues that by combining this axiology with the fundamental consequentialist principle of maximizing intrinsic value, one can create a theory that successfully accounts for justice without sacrificing consequentialist core principles. – AI-generated abstract.