works
Dan S. Felsenthal, Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport The Condorcet-efficiency of sophisticated voting under the plurality and approval procedures article This article focuses on decision making by voting in systems at the levels of the organization, the community, the society, and the international system. It examines the compatibility of the plurality and approval voting procedures with a number of normative properties commonly used to

The Condorcet-efficiency of sophisticated voting under the plurality and approval procedures

Dan S. Felsenthal, Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport

Behavioral Science, vol. 35, no. 1, 1990, pp. 24–33

Abstract

This article focuses on decision making by voting in systems at the levels of the organization, the community, the society, and the international system. It examines the compatibility of the plurality and approval voting procedures with a number of normative properties commonly used to

PDF

First page of PDF