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William J. FitzPatrick Morality and evolutionary biology online This article examines the connection between morality and evolutionary biology, distinguishing between three main branches of inquiry: descriptive evolutionary ethics, prescriptive evolutionary ethics, and evolutionary metaethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics, the article argues, seeks to explain the origins of moral behavior, including the capacity for normative guidance, altruistic tendencies, and various emotional responses. While the article acknowledges that evolutionary processes may have shaped these capacities, it suggests that the content of moral judgments and beliefs often results from autonomous reflection and reasoning rather than solely from evolutionary influences. Prescriptive evolutionary ethics, the article argues, attempts to derive normative conclusions from evolutionary theory. The article criticizes the traditional approach of “Social Darwinism,” arguing that it misunderstands the principles of Darwinian evolution and incorrectly attempts to justify moral norms based on biological adaptations. The article also argues that experimental psychology cannot conclusively establish the validity of consequentialist ethical theories over deontological ones, as often claimed by proponents of prescriptive evolutionary ethics. Finally, evolutionary metaethics, the article argues, explores the implications of evolutionary theory for the existence and nature of moral truths. The article examines several debunking arguments, which claim that the evolutionary origins of moral capacities undermine moral realism and support moral skepticism. The article argues that these debunking arguments are unconvincing, as they rely on unwarranted assumptions about the pervasive influence of evolutionary factors on our moral beliefs and underestimate the role of autonomous reflection and reasoning. The article concludes that while evolutionary biology can provide valuable insights into the development of moral capacities, it cannot definitively settle fundamental philosophical questions about the nature and justification of morality. – AI-generated abstract.

Morality and evolutionary biology

William J. FitzPatrick

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, December 19, 2008

Abstract

This article examines the connection between morality and evolutionary biology, distinguishing between three main branches of inquiry: descriptive evolutionary ethics, prescriptive evolutionary ethics, and evolutionary metaethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics, the article argues, seeks to explain the origins of moral behavior, including the capacity for normative guidance, altruistic tendencies, and various emotional responses. While the article acknowledges that evolutionary processes may have shaped these capacities, it suggests that the content of moral judgments and beliefs often results from autonomous reflection and reasoning rather than solely from evolutionary influences. Prescriptive evolutionary ethics, the article argues, attempts to derive normative conclusions from evolutionary theory. The article criticizes the traditional approach of “Social Darwinism,” arguing that it misunderstands the principles of Darwinian evolution and incorrectly attempts to justify moral norms based on biological adaptations. The article also argues that experimental psychology cannot conclusively establish the validity of consequentialist ethical theories over deontological ones, as often claimed by proponents of prescriptive evolutionary ethics. Finally, evolutionary metaethics, the article argues, explores the implications of evolutionary theory for the existence and nature of moral truths. The article examines several debunking arguments, which claim that the evolutionary origins of moral capacities undermine moral realism and support moral skepticism. The article argues that these debunking arguments are unconvincing, as they rely on unwarranted assumptions about the pervasive influence of evolutionary factors on our moral beliefs and underestimate the role of autonomous reflection and reasoning. The article concludes that while evolutionary biology can provide valuable insights into the development of moral capacities, it cannot definitively settle fundamental philosophical questions about the nature and justification of morality. – AI-generated abstract.

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