Broad and supernormal precognition

Abstract

Non-inferential veridical precognition faces three primary philosophical objections: epistemological, causal, and fatalistic. The epistemological challenge, which posits that one cannot stand in a cognitive relation to a non-existent future object, is resolved by treating precognition as analogous to memory. Rather than involving the direct prehension of future events, the process utilizes contemporary mental imagery to support beliefs in timeless propositions. The causal objection highlights the difficulty of explaining correspondences between present experiences and future events that lack a shared causal ancestry. Addressing this requires either postulating revolutionary spatial or temporal dimensions or recognizing the possibility of non-causal empirical laws that allow for correlations without traditional causal links. Finally, the fatalistic objection wrongly assumes that the predictability of a future event necessitates human helplessness or undermines voluntary decision-making. Logical necessity within an inference is distinct from physical compulsion; therefore, an event may be predetermined in a theoretical sense without being unpreventable by human agency. Predictability does not inevitably lead to a situation where efforts to avoid an outcome are rendered futile or counterproductive. Instead, the capacity for intervention remains logically compatible with the existence of non-inferential foreknowledge. – AI-generated abstract.