Disagreement

Abstract

This entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement. The entry starts by distinguishing between belief-disagreements (differences in doxastic attitudes towards a proposition) and action-disagreements (differences in attitudes towards an action), although it is argued that the latter can be translated into the former. Then, a framework is introduced that distinguishes between questions about (1) the rational response to disagreement, and (2) the rational belief to hold after encountering disagreement. The response to disagreement is argued to be independent of the final belief adopted. This framework is applied to various cases of disagreement, including disagreement between peers, superiors, inferiors, and unknowns. The entry then presents four views on the epistemic significance of peer disagreements: the Equal Weight View, the Steadfast View, the Justificationist View, and the Total Evidence View. It then discusses various issues related to the Equal Weight View, such as its self-defeating character, formal issues, and the problem of distinguishing between actual and merely possible disagreement. Finally, the article explores the skeptical threat posed by disagreement by arguing that for many controversial beliefs, one’s epistemic reasons for believing them are undermined by the existence of disagreement. – AI-generated abstract