Broad's analysis of ethical terms

Abstract

C.D. Broad’s meta-ethical development reflects a transition from early non-naturalist intuitionism to a nuanced, often non-committal stance shaped by emotive and dispositional theories. Prior to 1934, ethical judgments were treated as cognitive, with terms like “right” and “good” denoting unique, non-natural properties recognized through a priori intuition. Following this period, a shift occurs toward an emotional reaction theory, suggesting a departure from Moorean non-naturalism without a definitive embrace of traditional naturalism. This later position oscillates between an interjectional analysis, where ethical terms express unique moral emotions, and a transsubjective dispositional analysis, where they assert how a normal observer would react under standard conditions. Within this framework, the apparent synthetic necessity of moral principles is explained not as rational intuition, but as the result of social conditioning and evolutionary adaptation aimed at preserving social stability. Ultimately, the post-1934 analysis prioritizes the functional and emotional dimensions of moral language, moving ethical inquiry away from the detection of non-natural qualities toward an investigation of psychological and social dispositions. – AI-generated abstract.