Self-reference and the acyclicity of rational choice
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 96, no. 1, 1999, pp. 117–140
Abstract
Guided by an analogy between the logic of truth and the logic of a rationally choosing agent, I propose for the latter a principle of acyclicity, which blocks paradoxical self-referring reasoning. Certain decision-theoretic paradoxes are used to illustrate what can happen when acyclicity is violated. The principle, however, is argued for directly on grounds of coherence. Among its consequences are certain decision-theoretic rules, as well as a guiding line for setting Bayesian prior probabilities. From this perspective I discuss in the last two sections Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Paradox. © 1999 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
