Realism and rationality

Abstract

This article explores the tension between normative anti-realism and the positions and research activities common within the rationalist community. The author argues that rejecting realism may have a higher cost than generally acknowledged. Anti-realism, the view that there are no objective facts about what we should do, appears incompatible with the community’s interest in normative uncertainty, its apparent endorsement of Bayesianism and preference-based decision theory, and its engagement with normative decision theory research. The author suggests that if anti-realism is true, the community’s involvement in these topics might be seen as analogous to an atheist engaging enthusiastically in theological debates. The author, though not a realist, expresses sympathy for the view due to his perception that rejecting it would leave little to be said or thought about, and because belief in anti-realism seems to undermine itself. – AI-generated abstract