Practical reasoning and decision making: Hippocrate's problem, Aristotle's answer

Abstract

Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an action. But an action –\r\nat least a physical one – requires more than reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too.\r\nIntending to act is as close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical\r\nreasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an intention. Sections 1 and 2 of this paper argue\r\nthat there is such a thing as genuine practical reasoning, concluding in an intention. It can be\r\ncorrect, valid reasoning, and section 2 explains how.\r\nSection 3 deals with an incidental complication that is caused by a special feature of the\r\nconcept of intention. Sections 4 and 5 then explore the normativity of practical reasoning.\r\nThey argue that, although practical reasoning concludes in an intention, it gives the reasoner\r\nno reason to have that intention.\r\nThis paper considers only one type of practical reasoning, namely instrumental reasoning.\r\nMoreover, up to the end of section 5 it considers only instrumental reasoning that proceeds\r\nfrom an end to a means that the reasoner believes is necessary. This one special case is\r\nenough to demonstrate that genuine practical reasoning exists. But reasoning of this special\r\ntype is rare, so the remainder of the paper investigates how successfully the particular\r\nconclusions of sections 1–5 can be extended. It considers instrumental reasoning when the\r\nmeans is not believed to be necessary. Sections 6 and 7 examine and reject the idea that this\r\ntype of practical reasoning depends on normative reasoning. Section 8, 9 and 10 examine and\r\nreject the idea that decision theory provides a good account of it.\r\nAfter those negative arguments, section 11 looks for a correct account of instrumental\r\nreasoning from an end to a means that is not believed to be necessary