Practical reasoning and decision making: Hippocrate's problem, Aristotle's answer

Abstract

Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an action. But an action –\textbackslashr\textbackslashnat least a physical one – requires more than reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too.\textbackslashr\textbackslashnIntending to act is as close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical\textbackslashr\textbackslashnreasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an intention. Sections 1 and 2 of this paper argue\textbackslashr\textbackslashnthat there is such a thing as genuine practical reasoning, concluding in an intention. It can be\textbackslashr\textbackslashncorrect, valid reasoning, and section 2 explains how.\textbackslashr\textbackslashnSection 3 deals with an incidental complication that is caused by a special feature of the\textbackslashr\textbackslashnconcept of intention. Sections 4 and 5 then explore the normativity of practical reasoning.\textbackslashr\textbackslashnThey argue that, although practical reasoning concludes in an intention, it gives the reasoner\textbackslashr\textbackslashnno reason to have that intention.\textbackslashr\textbackslashnThis paper considers only one type of practical reasoning, namely instrumental reasoning.\textbackslashr\textbackslashnMoreover, up to the end of section 5 it considers only instrumental reasoning that proceeds\textbackslashr\textbackslashnfrom an end to a means that the reasoner believes is necessary. This one special case is\textbackslashr\textbackslashnenough to demonstrate that genuine practical reasoning exists. But reasoning of this special\textbackslashr\textbackslashntype is rare, so the remainder of the paper investigates how successfully the particular\textbackslashr\textbackslashnconclusions of sections 1–5 can be extended. It considers instrumental reasoning when the\textbackslashr\textbackslashnmeans is not believed to be necessary. Sections 6 and 7 examine and reject the idea that this\textbackslashr\textbackslashntype of practical reasoning depends on normative reasoning. Section 8, 9 and 10 examine and\textbackslashr\textbackslashnreject the idea that decision theory provides a good account of it.\textbackslashr\textbackslashnAfter those negative arguments, section 11 looks for a correct account of instrumental\textbackslashr\textbackslashnreasoning from an end to a means that is not believed to be necessary