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Irwin Goldstein Pleasure and pain: Unconditional, intrinsic values article That “all” pleasure is good and “all” pain bad in itself is an eternally valid ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict “particularism” (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and “relativism” (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M Hare, Gilbert Harman, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the many philosophers discussed.

Pleasure and pain: Unconditional, intrinsic values

Irwin Goldstein

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, no. 2, 1989, pp. 255–276

Abstract

That “all” pleasure is good and “all” pain bad in itself is an eternally valid ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict “particularism” (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and “relativism” (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M Hare, Gilbert Harman, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the many philosophers discussed.

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