Avoidable harm

Abstract

The moral relevance of avoidable harm is explored in this paper. It is argued that the notion of avoidable harm is relevant to moral obligations in at least three distinct places in moral theory: the morality of rescue, the morality of defensive harming, and the morality of supererogation. In each case, a harm is avoidable in the morally relevant sense only if it is morally permissibly avoidable and if the person in question is knowingly and conscientiously acceding to it without being motivated by a desire to avoid acting morally wrongly. Furthermore, the paper argues that the notion of cross-temporal ability relevant to moral permissibility is the “would-be-able” conception, rather than the “would” conception. Finally, it is argued that the notion of moral permissibility in play in the Moral Permissibility Condition is an objective one, and that Possibilism, rather than Actualism, is true of moral permissibility. – AI-generated abstract