The case for strong longtermism

Abstract

This paper argues that, in a wide class of decision situations, the best option ex ante is one whose effects on the very long-run future are best, even when we consider the uncertainty of further-future effects. This thesis is called ‘axiological strong longtermism’. The paper outlines a plausibility argument for this view, arguing that the size of the future renders effects on the long run particularly important. The paper then defends this claim against three classes of objections: empirical, axiological, and decision-theoretic. The authors conclude that the case for axiological strong longtermism is robust, and that the surprisingness of this view stems from surprising empirical facts rather than from problems with the underlying normative motivation. They then argue that a plausible non-consequentialist moral theory has to be sensitive to the axiological stakes, becoming more consequentialist in output as the axiological stakes get higher. This, they argue, leads to the conclusion that in a wide class of decision situations, we ought to prefer options whose effects on the very long-run future are best – AI-generated abstract.