Comparing existence and non-existence

Abstract

The existence comparativism/anti-comparativism debate concerns whether it can be better or worse, for a given person, that that person exists rather than not. Many have concluded that anti-comparativism follows from basic metaphysics, given that merely possible people do not exist and only actuals have ontological status. We argue that the Metaphysical Argument fails because its crucial premise is inconsistent with full existence comparativism and full anti-comparativism, and moreover proves too much, implying that no world is better than any other for any person. We also consider a different argument and suggest a reanalysis whereby personal betterness comparisons express not ternary relations with persons among their relata, but instead dyadic relations between possible lives (ways things might go for a given person). Such an account explains how non-existent people can still stand in personal betterness relations to others, and neither demands nor impugns existence comparativism. – AI-generated abstract.