The Moral Status of Animals

Abstract

Is there something distinctive about humanity that justifies the ideathat humans have moral status while non-humans do not? Providing ananswer to this question has become increasingly important amongphilosophers as well as those outside of philosophy who are interestedin our treatment of non-human animals. For some, answering thisquestion will enable us to better understand the nature of humanbeings and the proper scope of our moral obligations. Some argue thatthere is an answer that can distinguish humans from the rest of thenatural world. Many of those who accept this answer are interested injustifying certain human practices towards non-humans-practicesthat cause pain, discomfort, suffering and death. This latter groupexpects that in answering the question in a particular way, humanswill be justified in granting moral consideration to other humans thatis neither required nor justified when considering non-human animals.In contrast to this view, an increasing number of philosophers haveargued that while humans are different in a variety of ways from eachother and other animals, these differences do not provide aphilosophical defense for denying non-human animals moralconsideration. What the basis of moral consideration is and what itamounts to has been the source of much disagreement.