Prudential longtermism

Abstract

According to Longtermism, our acts’ expected influence on the value of the world is mainly determined by their effects in the far future. Given additive axiologies, such as total utilitarianism, there is a straightforward argument for Longtermism due to the enormous num- ber of people that may exist in the future. This argument, however, does not work on person-affecting views. In this paper, we will argue that these views may, in fact, also lead to Longtermism. The reason they may do so is that Prudential Longtermism may be true. Prudential Longtermism holds for you if and only if our acts’ overall influence on your expected well-being is mainly determined by their effects in the far future. We ar- gue that—due to a combination of anti-ageing, cryonics, uploading, and biological uploading—there could be an enormous amount of prudential value for you in the far future. This potential value may be so large that it dominates your overall expectation of lifetime well-being.