The duty to aid nonhuman animals in dire need

Abstract

The article’s main argument is that we have a duty to provide minimal aid to nonhuman animals in dire need, similar to that provided to severely cognitively impaired distant strangers. The author claims that: 1) the interests of an animal in dire need (continuing to live and avoiding pain) is comparable to the interests of a severely cognitively impaired distant stranger; 2) we morally must provide minimal aid and assistance to such individuals, regardless of their species membership; 3) environmental damage cannot be used as a counterargument because aid to individuals results in comparable damage; 4) the flourishing of an individual animal should not be curtailed because of natural disasters; and 5) contrary to popular belief, our duty does not result in an obligation to intervene in predation among animals as that falls beyond any practical means of intervening with minimal costs. – AI-generated abstract.