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Sven Ove Hansson Preference logic incollection Preference logic constitutes a formal framework for the study of evaluative principles, serving as a foundational tool for rational choice theory, modern economics, and belief revision. While its origins trace to classical philosophy, contemporary systems provide rigorous accounts of dyadic value concepts such as strict preference, indifference, and weak preference. Formal comparison structures typically define these relations through properties of asymmetry, symmetry, and reflexivity. Standard models often prioritize exclusionary preferences—where alternatives are mutually exclusive—yet the logic also addresses the relationship between comparative and monadic concepts like “good” or “ought.” A central theoretical concern involves the requirement of completeness, which assumes every pair of alternatives can be ranked. However, distinctions between uniquely resolvable, multiply resolvable, and irresolvable incompleteness reveal the complexities of incommensurability in decision-making. These logical properties, alongside transitivity and acyclicity, characterize the preferences of idealized rational agents and provide the necessary structure for formalizing value-based reasoning across the social sciences and moral philosophy. – AI-generated abstract.

Preference logic

Sven Ove Hansson

In D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.) Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Dordrecht, 2001, pp. 319–323

Abstract

Preference logic constitutes a formal framework for the study of evaluative principles, serving as a foundational tool for rational choice theory, modern economics, and belief revision. While its origins trace to classical philosophy, contemporary systems provide rigorous accounts of dyadic value concepts such as strict preference, indifference, and weak preference. Formal comparison structures typically define these relations through properties of asymmetry, symmetry, and reflexivity. Standard models often prioritize exclusionary preferences—where alternatives are mutually exclusive—yet the logic also addresses the relationship between comparative and monadic concepts like “good” or “ought.” A central theoretical concern involves the requirement of completeness, which assumes every pair of alternatives can be ranked. However, distinctions between uniquely resolvable, multiply resolvable, and irresolvable incompleteness reveal the complexities of incommensurability in decision-making. These logical properties, alongside transitivity and acyclicity, characterize the preferences of idealized rational agents and provide the necessary structure for formalizing value-based reasoning across the social sciences and moral philosophy. – AI-generated abstract.

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