Voices from another world: Must we respect the interests of people who do not, and will never, exist?

Abstract

The article critiques the view that the moral status of an action is determined only by its effects on actual people, a view the author calls moral actualism. The author argues that this view leads to implausible and even absurd conclusions when applied to cases where an agent’s actions affect the existence of future people. In particular, the author argues that actualism would entail that an agent can be obligated to do something that she cannot avoid doing, and that the moral status of an action can be different from what it would be if it were performed. The author rejects the claim that nonexistence is morally neutral, and explores several alternative approaches, arguing that they all ultimately fail to capture the moral significance of nonactual interests. Finally, the author presents a role-affecting approach to nonidentity cases, which appeals to the concept of “de dicto” goodness for. This approach avoids the pitfalls of actualism by taking into account the interests of nonactual people when making judgments about the moral status of actions. – AI-generated abstract