Broad's treatment of determinism and free will

Abstract

Moral obligation does not strictly entail the possibility of alternative action, as evaluative language frequently remains applicable even in cases of physical or psychological compulsion. While obligability functions independently of substitutability, moral responsibility (imputability) necessitates a specific form of freedom. This responsibility is grounded in whether an agent’s character makes them a fitting object for moral approval or disapproval within a sociological or ethical framework. Although causal determinism suggests every action is necessitated by a combination of stimulus and personality, freedom of the will is meaningfully defined by the relative contribution of the agent’s character. An action is categorically free and imputable when it is prompted by common, everyday stimuli—situations to which an average person is frequently exposed—rather than by exceptional external pressures or constraints. In these instances, the primary causal factor is the agent’s distinct personality rather than the environment. Consequently, moral responsibility persists under a deterministic framework by distinguishing between normal stimuli that reveal character and exceptional stimuli that constitute compulsion. – AI-generated abstract.