Two kinds of agent-relativity

I. L. Humberstone

The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 163, 1991, pp. 144

Abstract

It is possible to relativize obligation-statements to specific agents in order to register the dependence of what an agent should do upon the circumstances of the agent in question (the options available to one agent not guaranteed to be the same as those available to any other agent). It is also possible to relativize obligation-statements to specific agents in order to impute the onus of obligation to one rather than another agent in a situation in which several agents are involved. The present paper advertises the distinction between these two kinds of agent-relativization.

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[T]he appropriate circumstantial perspective to take in an honest and open discussion of what ought to be done (never mind who it may be ‘up to’ to do it) is that of all parties influenceable by the discussion—which one presumes to include one’s interlocutors. This gives rise to an invisible (or unarticulated) ‘we’ in the superscripted position of all ought-judgments. The grain of sense in the saying ‘There’s no use crying over spilt milk’ is in its recommendation to plan for the future, taking it as fixed that the milk has been spilt. The same goes for the milk that will be freely spilt by others whose conduct cannot be influenced by us.

Agent-Relativity
p.166