Paradox of Deontology

Abstract

. Consider a case in which, if some person A1 injures, lies to, kills, or in some other way violates another person P1, she will set in motion a chain of events that will prevent two other persons, A2 and A3, from similarly violating two other persons P2 and P3. Intuitively, it is wrong in such a case for A1 to violate P1: A1 has an obligation not to violate others just as A2 and A3 do, and prevention of their violations of P2 and P3 does not justify A1 in violating her obligation to P1. Rights, for example, are commonly understood as generating such obligations not to violate even in certain cases in which such a violation can prevent more such violations from happening (. see. Rights). Many moral theories, including deontological theories (. see. Deontology), attempt to provide rationales for such intuitive moral restrictions. .