The case for a priori physicalism

Abstract

The conflict between a priori and a posteriori physicalism concerns whether the necessitation of mental states by physical states is conceptually transparent or empirically discovered. A priori physicalism holds that a complete physical description of the world entails all psychological truths, as psychological properties are identical to physical properties and thus lack independent existence. Under this view, the inability to derive consciousness from physical facts is a result of cognitive limitations or unobvious conceptual impossibilities rather than a genuine ontological gap. In contrast, a posteriori physicalism maintains that while the world is entirely physical, the relationship between physical and phenomenal concepts is not deducible through analysis alone. Because phenomenal concepts are subjective and lack functional analyses, they create an explanatory gap that does not signify an ontological distinction. Psychophysical identities are instead established through inference to the best explanation based on empirical correlations. The choice between these frameworks depends on whether phenomenal concepts can be reduced to functional roles or whether they represent a unique epistemic access to physical states. Reconciling these views requires determining if the apparent contingency of the mental-physical link is a product of our conceptual representational systems or a fundamental feature of physical reality. – AI-generated abstract.