Impartiality

Abstract

Impartiality is sometimes treated by philosophers as if it wereequivalent to moral impartiality. Or, at the very least, theformer word is often used, without the qualifying adjective’moral’, even when it is the particularly moral conceptthat is intended. This is misleading, since impartiality in itsbroadest sense is best understood as a formal notion, while moralimpartiality in particular is a substantive concept - and oneconcerning which there is considerable dispute., The idea that impartiality is a defining feature of the moral outlookraises obvious questions and difficulties in relation to our ordinarybeliefs and behaviors. Most of us live in ways that exhibitconsiderable partiality toward relatives, friends, and other lovedones, and to others with whom we are affiliated or associated. Theexistence of vast global disparities in the distribution of wealth andaccess to resources may not seem to accord well with thecharacteristically modern view that all people are in some fundamentalsense equal from a moral point of view. Although general and abstractmoral principles requiring impartiality tend to strike many of us asfairly plausible, our more particular views and practices often seemto place considerably less significance on it., Though we will begin by addressing the broader, formal concept, andend with a brief discussion of issues raised by particularlyepistemic impartiality, this entry will be predominantlyconcerned with moral impartiality; the sort of impartiality, that is,that commonly features in normative moral and political theories.