Objective happiness

Abstract

An assessment of a person’s objective happiness over a period of time can be derived from a dense record of the quality of experience at each point-instant utility. Logical analysis suggests that episodes should be evaluated by the temporal integral of instant utility. Objective happiness is defined by the average of utility over a period of time. The concept of instant utility must be rich enough to support its role in the assessment of happiness. A purely hedonic concept will not be adequate. The bran constructs a running affective commentary, which evaluates the current state on a Good/Bad (GB) dimension. The commentary has physiological and behavioral manifestations. Although “Good” and “Bad” appear to be mediated by separate systems that can be active concurrently, the description of each moment by a single GB value remains useful. The GB dimension has a natural zero point, “neither pleasant nor unpleasant,” which retains its hedonic significance across contexts and permits a measurement of the relative frequencies and durations of positive and negative affect. Comparisons to expectations are an important source of pleasure and pain, but routine e instant utility. Objective happiness is defined by the average of utility over a period of time. The concept of instant utility must be rich enough to support its role in the assessment of happiness. A purely hedonic concept will not be adequate. The bran constructs a running affective commentary, which evaluates the current state on a Good/Bad (GB) dimension. The commentary has physiological and behavioral manifestations. Although “Good” and “Bad” appear to be mediated by separate systems that can be active concurrently, the description of each moment by a single GB value remains useful. The GB dimension has a natural zero point, “neither pleasant nor unpleasant,” which retains its hedonic significance across contexts and permits a measurement of the relative frequencies and durations of positive and negative affect. Comparisons to expectations are an important source of pleasure and pain, but routine experiences are not necessarily affectively neutral. Adaptation to new circumstances has been attributed to a “hedonic treadmill,” which reduces the hedonic effect of changes. Some of the evidence for a hedonic treadmill may be due to a satisfaction treadmill, in which the standards that people apply to declare themselves satisfied change. Peo9ple often assess the well-being effects of stats by using the affective value of transitions to these states. Such judgments ignore adaptation. Attempts to estimate the effect of changed circumstances on well-being are susceptible to a focusing illusion in which the weight of the new circumstance is exaggerated. Inferences from preferences to actual hedonic experience are risky. The imbalance of responses to losses and to gains is perhaps more pronounced in decisions than in experience. Retrospective evaluations of episodes give special weight to Peak Affect and End Affect and are insensitive to the duration of episodes. These characteristics of evaluation can yield absurd preferences. Questions about satisfaction with life domains or general happiness are answered by applying heuristics, which are associates with particular biases.