Some Paradoxes of Deterrence

Abstract

This article explores the moral paradoxes of deterrence, arguing that traditional moral doctrines such as the Wrongful Intentions Principle, the Right-Good Principle, and the Virtue Preservation Principle are incompatible with a plausible utilitarian perspective. It focuses on the situation of a defender who must intend (conditionally) to apply a harmful sanction to innocent people in order to deter an extremely harmful and unjust offense. While intending to apply the sanction would be morally wrong, the article argues that forming the intention could be morally right, given the large amounts of utility at stake. However, it also argues that a rational and morally good agent cannot logically have such an intention and that, to prevent the offense, such an agent would have to deliberately corrupt himself, which, again, would be morally wrong. These arguments raise questions about the compatibility of utilitarian ethics with traditional views of agent morality. – AI-generated abstract