Thirteen days: A memoir of the cuban missile crisis

Robert F. Kennedy

New York, 1969

Abstract

Robert F. Kennedy’s memoir of the Cuban missile crisis provides a first-hand account of the events from the perspective of the Attorney General and a key member of the President’s inner circle. The book focuses on the deliberations of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm), which advised President Kennedy on how to respond to the discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The memoir chronicles the tense negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union, highlighting the potential for miscalculation and escalation leading to nuclear war. Kennedy emphasizes the critical role of the President’s calm demeanor, his willingness to consult with a wide range of advisors, and his careful consideration of the Soviet Union’s position in shaping the US’s response. He ultimately argues for a measured approach, emphasizing the importance of diplomacy and avoiding direct military confrontation. – AI-generated abstract

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Quotes from this work

The possibility of the destruction of mankind was always in his mind. Someone once said that World War Three would be fought with atomic weapons and the next war with sticks and stones.
As mentioned before, Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August had made a great impression on the President. “I am not going to follow a course which will allow anyone to write a comparable book about this time, The Missiles of October,” he said to me that Saturday night, October 26. “If anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move. I am not going to push the Russians an inch beyond what is necessary.”
After it was finished, he made no statement attempting to take credit for himself or for the Administration for what had occurred. He instructed all members of the Ex Comm and government that no interview should be given, no statement made, which would claim any kind of victory. He respected Khrushchev for properly determining what was in his own country’s interest and what was in the interest of mankind. If it was a triumph, it was a triumph for the next generation and not for any particular government or people.
At the outbreak of the First World War the ex-Chancellor of Germany, Prince von Bülow, said to his successor, “How did it all happen?” “Ah, if only we knew,” was the reply.

[T]he gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our passion nor our devotion to our country.
It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America—except why we are proud that we are Americans.