The problem of evil: Moral constraints and philosophical commitments

Abstract

The philosophical argument from evil—the claim that pervasive suffering necessitates the non-existence of an omnipotent, benevolent Creator—cannot be sustained under rigorous dialectical scrutiny. A philosophical argument constitutes a failure if it lacks the capacity to convince a neutral, ideal audience in a controlled debate between an expert proponent and a critic. Distinguishing between the total volume of global suffering and specific local atrocities allows for the deployment of a refined free-will defense. In this framework, human and natural evils are understood as remote consequences of the abuse of autonomy by rational agents. Animal suffering and the absence of clear divine manifestations are further contextualized as necessary byproducts of a regular, non-capricious physical universe and the preservation of authentic moral choice. These justifications demonstrate that a world containing horrific suffering is logically consistent with the existence of a perfect Creator. Consequently, the argument from evil does not achieve its aim of demonstrating the non-existence of God. – AI-generated abstract.