Reply to Adamo, Key et al., and Schilling and Cruse: Crawling around the hard problem of consciousness

Abstract

Consciousness is a complex phenomenon, and its origins and characteristics are still debated. In a recent paper, Klein and Barron argue that insects possess a basic form of subjective experience, challenging the notion that consciousness requires complex cognitive abilities and a sophisticated nervous system. They argue that the insect brain, despite having fewer neurons, can support the key functions of the vertebrate midbrain, which they believe are essential for subjective experience. They further contend that the focus on access consciousness, the ability to report on one’s own mental states, is unnecessarily restrictive and that the capacity for subjective experience should be considered a more fundamental property. The authors address criticisms from several authors, including Adamo, Schilling and Cruse, and Key et al., who challenge their claims regarding the neural basis of consciousness in insects and the role of the midbrain. While acknowledging that the “hard problem” of consciousness remains unsolved, Klein and Barron advocate for a continued exploration of the neural structures and functions involved in subjective experience, even in simpler organisms like insects. – AI-generated abstract.