Debunking confabulation: Emotions and the significance of empirical psychology for Kantian ethics

Abstract

Debunking arguments against Kantian ethics based on empirical moral psychology often prove invalid due to their question-begging structure. Current neuroscientific claims that deontological judgments are mere rationalizations of emotional responses presuppose the absence of rational justification for the principles they critique. If a normative framework is independently justifiable, the presence of emotional correlates during judgment does not undermine its validity; rather, it may reflect the social or educational integration of rational insights. While empirical facts do not invalidate normative claims, they possess significant moral import regarding the practical application of ethics. Kantian theory acknowledges empirical psychology as a necessary component for identifying subjective conditions that hinder or facilitate the fulfillment of moral laws. Consequently, agents have an indirect duty to engage with psychological research—such as findings on self-regulation, cognitive bias, and implementation intentions—to enhance the efficacy of moral agency. Integrating these empirical findings allows for more effective strategies in achieving moral goals without compromising the rational basis of ethical principles. Shifting the focus from the potential for empirical psychology to debunk moral theories toward its utility in supporting moral practice provides a more fruitful integration of scientific data into normative thought. – AI-generated abstract.