Tiny Probabilities of Vast Utilities: Defusing the Initial Worry and Steelmanning the Problem

Abstract

This is the second post in a series. The first post is here and the third post is here. The fourth post is here and the fifth post is here. The previous section lay out the initial worry: Since Pascal’s Mugger’s argument is obviously unacceptable, we should reject the long-termists’ argument as well; expected utility arguments are untrustworthy. This section articulates an important difference between the long-termist’s proposal and the Mugger’s, and elaborates on how expected-utility reasoning works. The initial worry can be defused. There are pretty good arguments to be made that the expected utility of giving money to the Mugger is not larger than the expected utility of giving money to the long-termist, and indeed that the expected utility of giving money to the Mugger is not high at all, relative to your other options.