works
Stephan Körner Broad on philosophical method incollection Methodological distinctions between critical and speculative philosophy rely on the dual tasks of conceptual analysis and the synthesis of universal principles. Critical philosophy employs the principles of exceptional cases and “Pickwickian senses” to clarify and refine concepts used in science and daily life. Speculative philosophy attempts a non-deductive synthesis of human experience, often relying on postulates that function as synthetic a priori principles. A fundamental oversight occurs when failing to distinguish between exhibition-analysis—the description of accepted conceptual rules—and replacement-analysis—the modification of those rules. While exhibition-analysis is an empirical and autonomous activity, replacement-analysis is inherently dependent on regulative metaphysics. These regulative principles provide the criteria for determining conceptual defects and selecting appropriate replacements. Furthermore, speculative philosophy must be categorized into indicative, regulative, and non-propositional types to accurately reflect its logical function. Because replacement-analysis requires a commitment to specific regulative goals, the purported independence of analytical philosophy from metaphysics is untenable. The two fields are deeply interconnected, as the choice of analytical results frequently presupposes a preferred metaphysical framework. – AI-generated abstract.

Broad on philosophical method

Stephan Körner

In Paul Arthur Schilpp and Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.) The philosophy of C. D. Broad, New York, 1959, pp. 95–114

Abstract

Methodological distinctions between critical and speculative philosophy rely on the dual tasks of conceptual analysis and the synthesis of universal principles. Critical philosophy employs the principles of exceptional cases and “Pickwickian senses” to clarify and refine concepts used in science and daily life. Speculative philosophy attempts a non-deductive synthesis of human experience, often relying on postulates that function as synthetic a priori principles. A fundamental oversight occurs when failing to distinguish between exhibition-analysis—the description of accepted conceptual rules—and replacement-analysis—the modification of those rules. While exhibition-analysis is an empirical and autonomous activity, replacement-analysis is inherently dependent on regulative metaphysics. These regulative principles provide the criteria for determining conceptual defects and selecting appropriate replacements. Furthermore, speculative philosophy must be categorized into indicative, regulative, and non-propositional types to accurately reflect its logical function. Because replacement-analysis requires a commitment to specific regulative goals, the purported independence of analytical philosophy from metaphysics is untenable. The two fields are deeply interconnected, as the choice of analytical results frequently presupposes a preferred metaphysical framework. – AI-generated abstract.

PDF

First page of PDF