Existence in C. D. Broad's philosophy

Abstract

The philosophical framework of C. D. Broad lacks an adequate account of “existence” in its existentialist and anthropological sense, primarily due to an overarching commitment to physicalist ontology. By modeling human subjectivity after material substances, this system treats the person as a historical “strand” or a collection of event-slices analogous to physical objects. Such a conceptualization reduces the self to a reified entity, failing to recognize the unique character of self-origination and the ontological concern inherent in personal existence. This physicalist orientation further dictates a causal monism that precludes categorical moral obligation, as human agency is analyzed through the same deterministic lens applied to inorganic nature. Additionally, the treatment of existential propositions remains limited to formal logic and the linguistic properties of classes, which avoids the deeper metaphysical question of being. Ultimately, a metaphysical scheme prioritized by the methods and categories of physical science proves insufficient for articulating the qualitative distinction between essence and existence or for capturing the specific mode of being characteristic of the human person. – AI-generated abstract.