works
James Lenman On becoming extinct article This article explores whether the timing of human extinction matters and argues that it does not matter when, precisely, humanity disappears, from an abstract, impersonal perspective. Concerns about preserving the species are reasonable locally and personally, not because of grand philosophical visions of a narrative of human existence or some transcendental purpose. People simply want successors who will think about them and their work beyond their lifetime, which can be a central, virtuous part of an ethical life. This is seen in people’s ordinary desire to have children so that they can leave something behind themselves that they value. Yet, excessively pursuing this desire can lead to pathological situations, such as individuals having children regardless of projected negative outcomes. It is wrong to bring many people into the world whom we know will suffer, but it is not always a bad thing to expect risks generally associated with human life. The concern for having successors is defeasible, especially with the anticipation of significant harm or distress. – AI-generated abstract.

On becoming extinct

James Lenman

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 83, no. 3, 2002, pp. 253–269

Abstract

This article explores whether the timing of human extinction matters and argues that it does not matter when, precisely, humanity disappears, from an abstract, impersonal perspective. Concerns about preserving the species are reasonable locally and personally, not because of grand philosophical visions of a narrative of human existence or some transcendental purpose. People simply want successors who will think about them and their work beyond their lifetime, which can be a central, virtuous part of an ethical life. This is seen in people’s ordinary desire to have children so that they can leave something behind themselves that they value. Yet, excessively pursuing this desire can lead to pathological situations, such as individuals having children regardless of projected negative outcomes. It is wrong to bring many people into the world whom we know will suffer, but it is not always a bad thing to expect risks generally associated with human life. The concern for having successors is defeasible, especially with the anticipation of significant harm or distress. – AI-generated abstract.

PDF

First page of PDF