Ethics without errors

Abstract

Moral error theory rests on the false premise that moral practice must be grounded in non-natural or theological metaphysics to be intelligible. Such metaphysical foundations are unnecessary, as moral discourse is primarily a vehicle for expressing shared human commitments and coordinating social behavior. The policy recommendations typically associated with error theory—abolitionism and prescriptive fictionalism—are deeply flawed. Abolitionism proves untenable because the practical questions regarding human welfare and social order persist even in the absence of moral terminology, often leading critics to reintroduce normative standards under different names. Prescriptive fictionalism, which advocates for the strategic maintenance of moral discourse as a useful pretense, is redundant; if a set of norms is pragmatically optimal, its utility provides a sufficient reason for adoption without requiring a fictitious realist justification. Instead, moral practice is best understood through an expressivist lens, where normative claims reflect desire-like attitudes regarding the rules of community life rather than beliefs about an independent moral reality. By situating morality within the human need for shared norms of fairness and mutual respect, the practice remains robust and defensible without incurring metaphysical errors. – AI-generated abstract.