Informational lobbying: theory and effectiveness

Abstract

A few months ago, I started thinking about the Tullock paradox: “Why is there so little money in politics?” That is, given the extraordinarily large rewards available to an interest that captures the cooperation of government, why is outright corruption so rare, and why is industry’s expenditure on political influence relatively small? Tullock’s observation was made mostly with regard to campaign contributions, but it applies just as well to lobbying: the market for new vehicles in the U.S. was worth nearly half a trillion dollars in 2019, but the entire automotive industry spent only $70 million on lobbying – 0.01% of the value of the market. Tullock’s observation suggests that, for groups that want something from government, lobbying is potentially an extraordinarily long lever with which to move policy. The question motivating this review is whether that lever is also available for altruistic ends. This review has three purposes:

1. To serve as a reference regarding the effectiveness of informational lobbying for groups or individuals considering funding advocacy or influence campaigns.
2. To provide a starting point for others who may be interested in conducting further research themselves.
3. To try to answer to my satisfaction the question of whether lobbying works before we try to uncover the most effective lobbying tactics and techniques.