Most* small probabilities aren't pascalian

Abstract

Pascal’s mugging is a philosophical argument that suggests people should be extremely risk-averse in the face of arbitrarily low probabilities of catastrophic events, even if the expected value of such events is negligible. This article argues that such concerns are often misplaced, especially when dealing with risks that are not astronomically remote but rather on the order of one in a million or higher. The author provides several examples from various fields, such as aviation safety, voting, and asteroid defense, where routine measures are taken to mitigate risks of this magnitude without being considered irrational or succumbing to Pascal’s mugging. While the author acknowledges that the specific threshold for non-Pascalian probabilities is debatable, he proposes a conservative threshold of one in a million, arguing that such risks are routinely addressed in everyday life and considered reasonable prudence. Finally, the author argues that existential risks, while potentially significant, should be approached in a similar manner, with a focus on incremental risk reduction rather than heroics, and that the scale of the future justifies action even if the risks are not astronomically high. – AI-generated abstract.