Epistemic circularity and epistemic disagreement

Abstract

Epistemic circularity, the reliance on a belief-forming source to establish its own reliability, poses a fundamental challenge to the resolution of deep epistemic disagreements. While externalist frameworks may address the skeptical problem of the criterion by allowing for knowledge without prior justification of a method’s reliability, they fail to provide a mechanism for rationally resolving overt conflicts between competing fundamental epistemic principles. Deep disagreements arise when parties share common epistemic goals but utilize methods that are mutually circular and lack a shared higher principle for arbitration. Because epistemically circular arguments cannot provide reasons recognizable to an opponent who rejects the underlying method, such disputes remain epistemically irresolvable. This impasse suggests that the problem of epistemic disagreement is primarily practical rather than theoretical. Justifying the use of specific methods in the face of disagreement requires moving beyond epistemic reasons to practical considerations, such as those identified through a hypothetical “epistemic method game.” In this framework, rational agents operating under constraints of fairness would privilege methods that are repeatable, adaptable, public, and widespread. By prioritizing these virtues, agents can provide practical justifications that respect the autonomy of fellow judgers without presupposing the very reliability at issue. – AI-generated abstract.