Moral uncertainty and intertheoretic comparisons of value

Abstract

My thesis addresses the question: What is it more appropriate and less appropriate to do when one is morally uncertain? I aim to work out what are the most plausible choice-procedures: that is, ways of determining which actions are more or less appropriate in conditions of moral uncertainty. In chapter one I introduce the topic of decision-making under moral uncertainty, explain the framework within which my discussion takes place, and state a synopsis of my argument. In chapter two I consider one very natural choice-procedure, My Favourite Theory, and argue that it is not satisfactory. I introduce and defend an important condition of adequacy on all choice-procedures, the Pareto Principle. In chapter three I assume that value differences are not intertheoretically comparable, and ask: given this assumption, what is the most plausible choice- procedure? I argue that, given this assumption, all satisfactory choice- procedures are ‘Condorcet extensions’. In chapter four I assume that value differences are intertheoretically comparable and ask: given this assumption, what is the most plausible choice-procedure? I argue that there is a strong analogy here with decision-making under empirical uncertainty. In chapters five and six I ask: when are value differences comparable intertheoretically? In chapter five I argue that they are sometimes, but not always, intertheoretically comparable. In chapter six I give one sufficient condition for intertheoretic comparability. I conclude by proposing a default general choice-procedure.